Incident of 30/09/202506.10.2025

INCIDENT OF 30/09/2025


On 30/09/2025, from approximately 10:10, we recorded an increasing number of requests for the “Closed inspections” form. The Closed inspections form is by far the most demanding on the database server resources of all CIS TK forms, as it retrieves information on all closed inspections recorded in the database.

The high request frequency occurred at around 10:50, when it gradually exceeded 10 times the normal operating level.

These requests caused a high load on the database server and a gradual growth of the request queue.

The consequence was a gradual slowing of CIS TK response times and, in some cases, the denial of user requests.

Based on log analysis, the IP address and the specific STK station from which the dominant activity in requests for closed inspections originated were identified.

After communication with the statutory representative of that STK station, action was taken on the STK side which stopped the sending of queries.

At the same time, redundant requests for data on closed inspections were removed from the database server queue and CIS TK operation was restored to normal mode.

The incident can be classified as a locally induced DoS (Denial of Service) incident, while intentional conduct has not yet been conclusively proven, also in view of the immediate cooperation provided by the statutory representative of the relevant STK station.

CIS TK never experienced a complete outage at any moment; what was recorded was a slowdown and, in some cases, refusal of requests from some authorised users.

A more detailed analysis confirmed excessive activity from the account of technician M.K. from workplace XXX (STK No. XXX), where repeated requests for the Closed inspections form caused the creation and subsequent growth of the request queue on the database server. At peak time, the requests reached almost 11 times the technicians normal activity. It is necessary to emphasise that this was a properly authenticated user within the information system. However, this system had never been designed for such a level of load.

The event had been preceded by activity from the account of technician Ing. D.T., a technician of authorised entity YYY (STK No. YYY), through whose account and by deploying a data mining bot, automated mass querying was performed. The purpose of these queries was to obtain technical vehicle data and the complete history of technical inspections. The requests included not only vehicle technical data, but also information on inspections carried out, recorded defects, images made from the inspection lane or mobile application, and the results of the inspection itself.

There were 524 queries for vehicle technical data and 972 for technical inspection history, while that technician had not been processing a single inspection on that day. For comparison, on an ordinary working day, 5,000 to 7,000 inspections are closed across all STK stations in the Slovak Republic combined. This activity from Ing. D.T.s account consumed a substantial part of the system resources and ultimately caused a lower resilience reserve of the system against the non-standard activity from M.K.s account.

Besides the fact that such activity represents a significant load on infrastructure resources, it is also unauthorised collection and processing of data beyond the needs of a technician performing technical inspections, even though it was carried out using the technicians valid access rights.